

By the late 1980s the Colombian constitution had come under severe pressure for reform as the population shifted markedly from a rural to an urban majority. The president had repeatedly tried to provide policy to court the median Colombian voter, who was urban. The congress was strongly tied to rural interests. Congress consistently thwarted presidential efforts at policy reform. Different presidents again and again proposed constitutional reform as a way of achieving eventual policy aims, only to have the proposed reforms soundly rejected in the legislature. The Colombian congress solely possessed the authority to make constitutional revisions. This article tells the story of how this institutional impasse was overcome. In the wake of severe social strife and conflict a national referendum on constitutional reform was passed by popular vote and upheld by judicial action. This article argues that such constitutional conflict might only be overcome through extraconstitutional—although still democratic—means.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA Policy Adjustment Through Institutional Reform

DANIEL L. NIELSON
Brigham Young University

MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART
University of California, San Diego

The reemergence of institutional analysis of politics has compelled scholars to reexamine the effects of political rules on economic, social, and political outcomes. Yet, comparatively less attention has been focused on how those rules themselves are formed and changed. Institutional reform is a complex game with high stakes. Analysts can thus benefit from understanding what motivates, constrains, and empowers actors as they endeavor to reform political systems. This article pushes the problematic one step further: How can institutional reform occur when those who have the most to lose from reform hold exclusive rights to change the institutions?



We attempt to answer this question by examining the case of constitutional reform in Colombia. Colombian presidents, elected in a two-party system by a single nationwide constituency, became increasingly frustrated in their efforts to provide policy in response to the demands of urban voters, particularly urban swing voters, who had become crucial to presidential elections. Presidents repeatedly tried to modify policy to conform more fully to urban (median) voters' interests, but members of congress, elected by institutional rules that poorly reflect urban interests and instead overrepresent rural locales and clientele networks, repeatedly thwarted reforms. Colombian policy thus poorly represented the median voter.

Because the Colombian congress has the last say in legislative matters, presidents found it nearly impossible to turn their reform agenda into effective policy. Presidents needed a less particularistic congress whose incentives were better aligned with urban voters' interests. Such a realignment of incentives could only be achieved through constitutional reform. The problem: The Colombian congress itself held the sole authority to reform the constitution. The story of how Colombian presidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s overcame this institutional impediment to policy adjustment provides an interesting case study of constitutional reform. We argue that policy crisis compelled eventual reform. The neglect of the median/urban voter grew so grave that social unrest and political violence escalated to the point that the masses of Colombian voters overwhelmingly cried out for constitutional change in a national referendum. The president both fomented and capitalized on voter unrest, and the Supreme Court narrowly upheld his extraconstitutional maneuver. The case thus illuminates a central question regarding institutional change: How can the reform of rules be achieved when the object of reform is the very body that controls the rules?

This article addresses this question, proceeding as follows. First, we outline our conceptual framework. Second, we look at the Colombian political institutions and the obstacles they placed in the path of policy adjustment. Third, we describe the policy-reform motivations of Colombian presidents and contrast them with incentives of Colombian legislators. Fourth, we discuss the procedures by which the leading party's leadership succeeded in forcing the constitutional reform process outside the sitting congress and into a special constituent assembly, in a process linked to the demobilization of a guerrilla group. Fifth, we argue that the Colombian electoral system has been moved in a direction that will likely give greater attention to urban, median-voter concerns, which should help consolidate policy reform. We conclude with some brief reflections on the generalizability of our framework.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY ADJUSTMENT

Although we do not make use of formal models in this article, we invoke the concept of the median voter to illustrate the political environment of Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the classic explication of the median-vote theorem, Downs (1957) argued that political candidates will have incentives to converge on the median voter, adopting policy platforms that are extremely similar, if not distinguishable from each other. He argued that this result holds given certain conditions: a two-party system, a single-issue dimension, and a normal distribution of voters within the electorate. Since this early exposition, spatial models have become increasingly complicated and the theoretical results much less simple (see, e.g., Austen-Smith & Banks, 1988; Enelow & Hinich, 1984; McKelvey, 1986). But Downs's central claim remains strong: Given certain conditions, candidates' promised policy should target the median voter. For several reasons, the Downsian conditions hold for the Colombian presidency but not for the congress. This disjunction of electoral incentives provoked substantial policy and institutional crises. How these crises were resolved is the story of this article.

We focus on one overarching issue dimension in Colombian politics: the rural-urban divide. During the last three decades in the country, a strong case could be made that the urban-rural dimension is the most salient issue in the Colombian polity. In the late 1950s, when the Colombian political system emerged from violence and established its modern political order, the median voter in Colombia was rural. However, by the late 1980s/early 1990s, when our story reaches its climax, massive migration to the cities meant that the median voter in Colombia had become decidedly urban. Colombian electoral institutions had not been modified in the interim. Still, Colombian presidents attempted to be relatively responsive to this shift in the electorate. In their campaigns and policy platforms, presidential candidates courted the median Colombian voter. However, Colombian legislators lagged significantly behind the demographic shift, remaining responsive largely to rural interests and the clientele networks in the countryside that elected them. By the late-1980s, this policy conflict reached crisis proportions.

At least three different effects of Colombia's political institutions opened this chasm between executive and legislative policy goals. We elaborate on each of these effects below as we relate the story of Colombian constitutional reform but provide a brief conceptual overview here. First, severe malapportionment exists in the electoral system. The countryside was significantly

overrepresented in the Colombian Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Even though the Colombian voting population was more than 70% urban by 1990, a majority of seats in both houses were held by rural legislators. However, because the presidency is elected in a single, nationwide district, such malapportionment by definition was not a factor for the executive.

Second, the Colombian executive faced what Cox (1990) calls centripetal incentives, but the legislature was more responsive to centrifugal incentives. Because the presidency is elected by plurality rule in a single-seat district, candidates for the office face incentives to converge on the median voter. Thus, incentives under such rules promote centripetal or center-seeking behavior by candidates. This is the central insight of much of the spatial theory of elections, beginning with Downs's (1957) seminal work.¹ Hence, the platforms of both parties seeking the presidency should reflect the median voter's concerns, which in the Colombian case were urban interests.

However, members of the Colombian congress were elected by proportional representation (PR) in medium-sized electoral districts (between five and eight seats per district). According to Cox (1990), proportional representation creates incentives for candidates and parties to disperse rather than converge. Sometimes this dispersion results in divergent policy platforms from which voters can choose options closest to their ideal points. However, a more general claim about PR is made by Myerson (1993): Candidates under PR will seek to appeal to a distinct minority bloc of voters. Coupled with a third feature of the Colombian legislative electoral system, intraparty

1. There has been a recent spate of revisions of the original Downsian thesis. In two prominent challenges, what Iversen (1994) calls the directional and mobilization models, proponents argue that incentives for parties and candidates actually exist to diverge from the median voter's interests, for candidates and parties to become more extreme than their own electorates. Advocates of the directional model argue that party leaders should diverge from the median voter to provide a clear choice for voters (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989; Rabinowitz, Macdonald, & Listhaug, 1991). Voters hold somewhat vague preferences and thus need candidates to provide them clear—and moderately extreme—articulations of policy goals in the general direction of their preferences. Defenders of the mobilizational model hold that party leaders take more extreme positions than their constituents in an attempt to persuade or lead their constituents to change their preferences in the long term, and thus mobilize them for their political aims (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). Evidence exists that supports both models (Iversen, 1994). However, these revisions do not substantially challenge our use of the median voter concept. If anything, they make our case stronger. If either hypothesis holds, then a case could be made that Liberal candidates for the Colombian presidency should be even more responsive to urban voter concerns, in an attempt to either mobilize support for urban concerns or to provide a clear articulation of the urban agenda for urban voters. In both cases, the rift between the presidency and the Congress should grow, leading to the crisis we detail.

competition, the result is a decided *lack* of policy content in legislative elections as candidates seek to appeal to very narrow groups of voters on a clientelistic basis.

Third, the specific variant of PR rules used in Colombia provide strong incentives for congressional candidates to pursue personal, service-related votes rather than party or policy-oriented votes (see Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Katz 1980). Carey and Shugart (1995) have noted that systems with a strong personal vote are ones where individual candidates have significant control over their own nominations, voters vote for individual candidates and not for parties, and votes are not pooled within the party so that excess candidate votes cannot help the party at large. In this classification, Colombia's congressional electoral system before 1990 scores as extremely personalistic. Colombian congressional candidates essentially nominate themselves for office without any type of party approval, voters vote for individual subparty lists that usually elect only a single candidate, and votes are not pooled among lists. In addition, candidates have tended to raise and spend their own campaign funds rather than rely on central disbursements from the party. Thus, Colombia is at the extreme personal end of the personal-vote scale (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Nielson, 1997a).

Moreover, both quantitative and qualitative evidence, as well as theory, suggest that such a personal-vote system leads legislators to pursue pork and patronage for their clienteles and to largely ignore national policy goals focused on public goods provision in the interests of the median voter (Cox & McCubbins, 1996; McCubbins & Rosenbluth, 1995; Nielson, 1997a, 1997b). In Colombia, this has led to a system wherein blocs of voters are tightly tied to specific legislators and these voters rely heavily on their patrons for private political goods and clientelistic delivery of government services. Colombian analysts go so far as to call those types of voters "captive," as switching their loyalties to another party would immediately lose them valuable pork or patronage, and any proposed new party would likely not trust them (Urrutia, 1994). By definition, then, a captive voter cannot swing to other parties and thus cannot be classified as the median voter. These captive voters are disproportionately rural.

However, the plurality election of the Colombian executive does not produce the same personal-vote incentives for presidential candidates. Instead of facing a choice between multiple candidates from each major party, voters in presidential elections face one candidate per party. Thus, presidential election campaigns focus much more clearly on the contest between parties and their national policy platforms than do congressional elections.² The crucial difference is thus the lack of intraparty competition, coupled with the single-

member district. Personal characteristics of presidential candidates are certainly highly significant (e.g., the character question), but with each candidate being the sole standard-bearer of a party seeking a majority of the vote, the election will tend to be decided by swing voters, who, by definition, are not captive. In Colombia, these swing voters are found in the cities. The Liberal Party learned this lesson painfully in 1982 when it lost the presidency because its candidate failed to be as responsive to urban concerns as his Conservative opponent and a third, "New Liberal," candidate.

By now, the effects we have described indicate a policy chasm of sizable proportions between the Colombian executive and legislature. How could such a gap ever be bridged? It wasn't, exactly. The motto for Colombian presidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s seems to have been the following: If you can't bring the congressional institutions closer to you, tear them down and build new ones—even if it means bypassing the constitution in the process. However, such institutional demolition does not occur without political consequences, and, like many other wrecking projects, can only happen in the wake of severe crisis. In the Colombian case an escalating crisis gave presidents an impetus to act. Massive urbanization and, in the 1990s, economic liberalization, had drastically altered the median voter's policy demands, but Colombian institutions proved impotent to respond with the new demanded policy. Social unrest and political violence swelled until massive public outcries demanded institutional change. The rest of this article relates the story of Colombian political institutions and how they provoked a crisis that resulted in an extraconstitutional reform of the Colombian political system.

COLOMBIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS

For purposes of our conceptual framework, Colombia is a highly illustrative case. Given electoral institutions such as those in Colombia and given a two-party system, a party that seeks to hold office must strike a precarious balance between catering to narrow captive voters (to maintain its legislative majority) and catering to the median voter (to sway unaffiliated voters who might make the difference between winning and losing presidential

2. That parties tend to converge on the median voter in such elections and that elections are thus won or lost in the "center" does not preclude parties' offering somewhat distinct platforms to cater to their more activist rank and file. The important point is that voters can more easily see the campaign as an opportunity for a policy choice than is the case in congressional elections.

elections). In Colombia, such unaffiliated voters—who, as we show below, are indeed less loyal to any one party than are voters in congressional elections—mainly consist of urban voters. Thus, Colombia is a very useful case because it combines a personalistic legislative electoral system, a nationally elected executive, and a two-party system in which one party has been dominant.³ The story of constitutional reform is the story of how this precarious balance was upset and how the resulting crisis induced institutional change.

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Prior to 1990, each Colombian department (province) formed a district, electing by proportional representation at least two seats and an average of about eight for the House of Representatives. Senators were elected from the same districts, with the average number of seats being about five. Both houses were seriously malapportioned, such that the most underrepresented district in each house had more than 3.5 times the number of registered voters per seat as the most overrepresented district. The most underrepresented districts were those that contain the major urban centers. As a result, by 1986, more than half the members of Congress were elected primarily by rural voters, even though more than 60% of the population was urban (Archer, 1990, pp. 256-257). By 1990, Martz (1997) reports that more than 70% of the Colombian population was in the urban sector (pp. 143, 265), and so the malapportionment problem intensified as the legislature remained majority rural.

Before the 1990 constituent assembly, the electoral system used in Colombia for congress was based on the country's tradition of regional—and mostly rural—elites. The most salient feature of the Colombian electoral system has long been the tendency of each major party to present more than one list of candidates in any given electoral district. Because the lists are not linked—a vote for one list assists the election only of candidates on that list and cannot be pooled with votes for other lists—there is tremendous intra-party competition.

3. Those who would dispute our characterization of Colombia as a dominant party system would point to the legacies of the 1958 to 1974 National Front power-sharing regime and claim that the benefits of being the largest party are not great: Even after 1974, the constitution required the winning party to offer the second party "adequate and equitable participation" in the cabinet. Nonetheless, we believe that by 1990, the Liberal Party had established itself as dominant. For instance, Bushnell (1993) notes that Liberal Party presidents between 1974 and 1990 progressively reduced the share of patronage available to the Conservatives (pp. 249-251).

Although a list can elect more than one member if it obtains sufficiently more than one “quota” of votes (see appendix), in recent elections up to 90% of legislators have been elected from lists that elected no other candidate. This tendency results from the lower cost (in number of votes) of winning seats by “remainder” (*residuo*) rather than by quota (*cuociente*), as shown in the appendix. When no list wins enough votes for two (or more) seats, the M highest vote winners each get one seat, where M is the number of seats allocated in the district.⁴ Central party leaders also have not had control over the use of the party name, so lists proliferated as candidates sought election by remainder under the party of their choice. These aspects of the electoral system have made Colombian legislative elections highly personalized.

The phenomenon of *auxilios parlamentarios* (pork-barrel funds) further decentralized control within the parties. Since a constitutional amendment in 1968, funds were guaranteed to all incumbents to be used for “special projects.” In practice, members used these funds for their reelection campaigns or for the campaigns of their successors in the case of retiring members. With candidates and local clientele networks controlling the creation of lists, the Colombian party leadership had no choice but to rely on the local machines to deliver votes. With access to the congress relatively easy as long as a candidate had money and ties to a bloc of voters, party leaders faced a sharply limited ability to control the makeup of their delegations in congress.

CLIENTELISM AND BYPASSING THE MEDIAN VOTER

The sum total of the Colombian electoral rules creates strong incentives for congressional candidates to cultivate personal followings disproportionately in rural areas, which they maintain by making local-level deals. Such deals involve an organization’s delivery of a promised number of votes to a candidate in exchange for private benefits; that is, pork and patronage. As Urrutia (1991) notes, “The political structure of the parties produces a congress and city councils mostly interested in distributing the budget to the largest number of potential clients” (p. 383).

With specific reference to economic policy, Revéiz and Pérez (1986) note that the Colombian policy-making process is characterized by the “institutionalized representation within the state” of private sector interests, especially coffee and construction, for the setting of monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, “politicians and regional interests” control fiscal policy and “the channeling of state resources,” meaning that public spending tends to be skewed in

4. In this sense, the system is effectively identical to the single nontransferable vote used in Japan until 1993. See Cox and Shugart (1995).

favor of narrow interests of the clientele networks. The result is that the interests of the median voter are poorly represented. Large economic interests and members of politicians' clientele networks are well served, but the provision of public policy for broader interests, including the urban swing voter, is minimized. This kind of outcome is typical of electoral systems that encourage intraparty competition within local districts (cf. the discussion of Japan in Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1993, pp. 8-10). To stay alive in intense intraparty competition, party machines receive contributions from large private interests and channel them to their clienteles. As a result, the Liberal Party has maintained its dominance of the legislature without needing to be responsive to the median voter in congressional elections.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Compounding these electoral incentives for particularism, Colombia is unique among presidential systems in that congressional majorities alone have legal sovereignty over the constitution. In most presidential systems, a constitutional amendment must be passed by three fifths or two thirds of legislators and may require ratification by referendum, provincial legislatures, or some other mechanism to ensure that the congressional majority of the day cannot change the constitution to its advantage (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). Not so in Colombia. After 1968, amendments to the constitution required only an absolute majority of all members of each house, voting in two consecutive regular legislative sessions. Thus, in principle, the legislative majority can do anything it wants with the constitution. This brings us to the second point: what the actors with ultimate authority over the constitution want to do with that authority.

As we indicated in the previous section on the electoral system and legislative particularism, above all else, members of the legislature have sought the ability to continue to service the disproportionately rural clientele networks of which they are a part. Hence, any constitutional amendment that might serve to undercut the ability of politicians to cultivate personalistic relations with their own electorates would be doomed to defeat. Indeed, the history of Colombia between the end of the National Front (1974) and 1990 is filled with failed attempts to reform the constitution. In each case, presidents submitted proposals only to see them flounder in congress. Thus, constitutional reform appears to be a difficult thing to achieve in Colombia, despite the formal ease of the process. The key to this paradox is in what kind of reforms have been proposed. In Colombia, presidents have sought to move the system more toward an urban-centered agenda, but congressional majorities have preferred the status quo. To understand why presidents' incentives differ

from those of congress, we need to understand the institutional characteristics of the president's constituency and from where sprung the executive's incentives for reform.

THE CRISIS OF URBAN NEGLECT

As noted, the president is elected in a single nationwide constituency and cannot be immediately reelected. From the establishment of direct presidential elections in 1910 until the 1991 constitution, the president has been elected by plurality (relative majority). Under the new constitution, an absolute majority is required, either in a first round or in a two-candidate runoff, and there is a lifetime limit of one term. The successful presidential candidate must attract a coalition that transcends the far narrower constituencies that individual members of congress carve out for themselves. The president therefore faces significant incentives to cultivate the median voter, who is urban. Historical experience has hammered this lesson home.

Urban voters have become the swing vote in Colombian presidential elections. The data suggest that the subset of urban voters who turn out only for presidential elections are less loyal to one party than are other voters (Archer & Shugart, 1997). This can be demonstrated in terms of party identification. In one study conducted as early as 1976 to 1977, only 59% of the urban population claimed any particular party affiliation, whereas among the rural population fully 74% professed association with a party (Hartlyn, 1988, p. 162). Since then, party identification in the cities has continued to slip, whereas it has held relatively steady in the countryside, where membership in the Liberal or Conservative Parties appears almost as if inherited and as immutable as religious or ethnic identity (Hartlyn 1988).

This sagging party loyalty in the cities manifested itself strongly in national elections. Thus, presidential votes are much more volatile than congressional votes, as Figure 1 shows. As implied, this greater volatility stems mainly from shifts in urban swing voters' preferences for given candidates and their programmatic promises. Ordinarily in Colombia, there have been only two important parties, the classic situation for responsiveness to the median voter (Downs, 1957); the centripetal incentives thus manifest themselves (Cox, 1990). On the other hand, the congressional vote is less volatile because members of congress and their clientele networks garner votes by targeting their narrow constituencies with services that keep them loyal.

In congressional elections urban turnout is notoriously low, stemming from the fact that urban voters belong in much smaller proportions to the captive clientele networks so important to legislative races. On the other hand, in




Figure 1. Vote for major Colombian parties, 1974 to 1990.

presidential elections, urban turnout often surpasses rural participation (Hartlyn, 1988, p. 163). Apparently, urban voters are significantly more likely to go to the polls when they feel their vote actually counts. Statistical analysis has corroborated this urban abstention from congressional elections (Losada & Velez, 1982, p. 184). Presidential candidates are aware of this all-important swing vote and actively court it.

Because the median voter—whose policy-based assessment of the parties and candidates can shift from one election to the next—is by definition outside of the “captive” clientele networks, a party that seeks to win a presidential election has the imperative of responding to the demands of urban voters. As urban voters’ numbers swelled, so did their policy requirements. Issues of employment, wages, and socioeconomic conditions of the urban sector thus vaulted to the political foreground.

However, the particularistic nature of the congress seemed incapable of coping with these preference changes in the electorate (Martz, 1997, p. 144). Even though national party leaders were convinced that social unrest had to be countered by aggressive social programs in the cities, congress seemed intent on catering only to those regional particularistic needs that they represented (Hartlyn, 1988, p. 113). Hence, urban unrest intensified. Demands for

urban infrastructure, housing, and the removal of clientele networks as mediators between citizens and government agencies⁵ have been central to social mobilization in the form of frequent and increasingly intense *paros cívicos* (civic strikes) during recent decades (Carrillo Bedoya, 1981; de la Torre, 1985; Santamaría & Silva, 1984).

Many urban Colombians perceived the country's greatest problem to be the exclusiveness of the political system, as typified by the National Front period. The rampant clientelism and accompanying corruption caused widespread discontent about the practice of politics in the country and about the content of the policies that the political system produced. Some groups, such as the M-19, took up arms to exploit popular frustration with the failure of the political system to provide for greater participation and for social welfare needs (Juárez, 1993; Shugart, 1992a). Political violence and conflict reached levels that had not been seen since *la violencia* (the political violence of the 1950s) brought on the National Front. Many observers thought that the stability of the regime itself—let alone the Liberal majority—could no longer be taken for granted. The urban-rural problem thus reached crisis proportions.

Fully aware of the disjunction between the clientelistic bias in congressional policy making and the policy demands of the electorally crucial urban constituency, each president after the National Front period has pursued an urban policy agenda. But each has had much if not all of his efforts blocked by the congress. As a result, presidents have attempted to implement some programs by bypassing the legislature altogether through use of decrees or appeals for constituent assemblies to redraft the rules of the game. However, decrees are ineffective because long-term structural change requires regular legislation or constitutional amendments (Archer & Shugart, 1997), and, as we have seen, in these areas congress has the ultimate authority.

Liberal presidents Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978) and Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) both had reform packages defeated in congress,⁶ but it was the 1982 election that was a critical point for the Liberal Party. In that election, it lost the presidency due to the presence of two candidates who more successfully mobilized the urban electorate than did the Liberal nominee, López, running for a second term.

The 1982 election featured a splinter from the Liberal Party, Luis Carlos Galán, running as a New Liberal. He won only 10.9% of the national vote, but this difference was enough to defeat López, who received 41.0% to the 46.8%

5. For an excellent theoretical statement of this general problem and some Mexican examples, see Fox (1994).

6. Colombians rarely reflect on Turbay as a reformer, but he not only resubmitted much of López's reforms but added his own in the realm of the judiciary, banking, and economic planning (Arboleda, 1982).

received by the Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur⁷ (see Figure 1). The crisis for the Liberal Party is especially noticeable in the municipality of Bogotá, home to 13.3% of the Colombian voting population. In the city, Betancur won 42.8%, compared with the average 28% won by Conservative nominees other than Betancur between 1974 and 1990.⁸ Galán won 31.2% of the vote in Bogotá, largely by campaigning for a “moralization” of Colombian political life, denouncing violence, corruption, and clientelism. Galán wooed city dwellers by promising the “transformation of congress and reform of its traditional domination by political elites” (Martz, 1997, p. 199).

Betancur similarly emphasized a commitment to make Colombia more democratic and less violent by negotiating with the guerrillas, promoting a package of reforms to redefine the role of political parties and enhance popular participation, and to professionalize public services. He actively courted urban voters. “In the urban areas, where party identification was steadily weakening, [Betancur] minimized partisan rhetoric and stressed his personal style of populism” (Martz, 1997, p. 202). He focused on issues such as low-cost housing without the need for a down payment, pledged to counter inflationary pressures and unemployment, and held out the possibility of attending university through correspondence courses (Martz, 1997, p. 202).

In this election, voter turnout jumped a full 10% from the previous presidential election of 1978 and also grew by 10% over the congressional election earlier in the year (Martz, 1997). Again, this increase in turnout was due almost exclusively to greater interest among urban voters—showing again their massive potential to swing elections. The importance of the 1982 election was in its demonstration to the Liberal Party of its vulnerability. Usually assured of victory, the party could no longer count on the urban vote or even on party unity in presidential elections if it failed to respond to demands for reforms. The party’s candidate failed to court the urban electorate—it was unresponsive to centripetal incentives to converge on the median voter—and the party paid a severe price, losing the presidency for the first time since the end of the National Front period.

But campaigns are one thing; actually legislating is a different affair altogether. Betancur’s reform efforts subsequently fell short because of the failure of either congress or the guerrillas to follow his lead. In 1986, with the

7. In both 1978 and 1982, Betancur ran as a “superpartisan” candidate, backed by a so-called National Movement that reached beyond the traditional Conservative machines. Hence, his higher vote share than that obtained by Conservative nominees in other presidential elections.

8. The Conservative won 17.7% in 1974 and 30.0% in 1986. The “official” Conservative nominee and a Conservative running as a dissident independent won a combined 36.3% in 1990, with most of that (31.8%) going to the independent (Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, who had been the party’s nominee in 1974).

New Liberals having won only about 7% percent of the vote in the congressional election—underscoring the difficulty of using a policy-based appeal in personalistic elections—Galán resumed working within the party, which elected Virgilio Barco with a large majority.

Barco prepared the largest constitutional reform package yet. He was explicit about his intent to bring a new constitutional order. In his first congressional address, Barco declared that

generations were altering the very structure of society: Nothing has stayed the same. Today's country is not the same. Why maintain . . . a constitutional precept that constrains the full exercise of democracy and was only justified by a stage of our history? (Martz, 1997, p. 243)

But yet again, the constitutional reform was defeated in congress in 1988. In the end, Barco, like his predecessors, attempted to circumvent congress, via a constituent assembly.

By 1989, the pressure for change had grown so great from nearly all of the major forces in Colombian society—spurred further by the assassination of Galán, by then Barco's certain successor—that Barco sought extraconstitutional means to enact the reforms whose absence he claimed was rending Colombian society. The country's new constitution thus is the culmination of nearly two decades of political reform efforts by presidents and leaders of both major parties, against the wishes of congressional majorities.

CONVOKING A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

After the defeat in 1988 of their constitutional amendment package that, among other provisions, would have allowed for a plebiscite as a means to reform the constitution, President Barco and then-Minister of Government Gaviria helped to promote a nascent student movement in favor of constitutional reform. This movement sponsored an unofficial plebiscite on the day of congressional elections in March 1990, and more than 1 million voters took the initiative to deposit slips of paper advocating a constituent assembly into their ballot envelopes (Shugart, 1992b).

After the student-sponsored unofficial referendum, President Barco used his state-of-siege powers to decree an "official" referendum in conjunction with the May 1990 presidential election. The proposal before voters, to allow for a special constituent assembly to reform the Constitution, passed with more than 88% of the vote. This whole process appears absolutely

unconstitutional, given that the Constitution of 1886 gave congress sole authority to reform the Constitution. Yet, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the decree on the grounds that the state-of-siege powers permitted the president, in times of “abnormality,” to respond to the “primary constituency,”⁹ as represented in the popular clamor for a constituent assembly.

Subsequently, the key to passing reforms that overcame the personalistic nature of the system was to ensure that interests represented in the constituent assembly were sufficiently different from those in congress. To that end, Gaviria and party leaders tied the constitutional reform project to the process of demobilizing the country’s guerrilla groups, especially the infamous M-19 (Shugart, 1992a). In a letter to the leaders of major political groups, including the M-19, on the constitutional reform, Gaviria said,

In the development of this process of institutional change, we must be really aware that the constitutional reform is an instrument of national reconciliation. This is not only because some guerrilla groups that have demobilized and that comply with certain requirements can eventually have seat in the Constitutional Assembly, but also because the amplification of democracy and the institutional change will bring to the opposition groups in the society an opportunity to come out of the marginality in which they find themselves. The reform is a mechanism of national pacification. (The letter of July 28, 1990, from the president on the theme of the Constitutional Assembly; see Colombia, 1990)

The M-19 had never participated in congressional elections and could be expected to favor a political system oriented away from those particularistic, regional interests that it had defined as “corrupt and antidemocratic.” Similarly, it could be expected to seek a new constituency of urbanites and other unorganized interests disaffected with the old practices. The inclusion of the M-19 in the process was thus a political strategy. Both the M-19 and reformist leaders in the Liberal Party shared a common goal of opening up the political system to more programmatic competition and to enhancing the voice of urban sectors (Shugart 1992a).

Thus, a *de facto* alliance resulted between the M-19 and sections of the Liberal Party tied to Gaviria, and breakaway Conservatives grouped in the so-called Movement for National Salvation. This was a natural (if ironic) result of these groups’ common pursuit of a reorientation of Colombian political life away from excessive dependence on the vote—delivering ability of relatively autonomous party rank and file. But to win seats in the constituent assembly would require a different electoral system—one that did not require the provision of pork to win.

9. The decision, as well as the relevant presidential decrees are reprinted in López (1990).

Under another state-of-siege decree in August 1990, President Gaviria mandated that the constituent assembly would be elected in a single nationwide district of 70 seats instead of in the regional districts used to elect the congress. Members of the congress or the executive were not permitted to run without first resigning their posts. In the election for the assembly, held in December 1990, the Liberals won more seats (24) than any other party or movement in the election. However, the Liberals were, as usual, fragmented among several lists, most of which won the bulk of their votes in a particular region. Even so, some prominent leaders of the party successfully appealed for votes outside of their own region. For example, only 22% of Jaime Castro's votes came from his home department (Boyacá), whereas about 32% came from Cundinamarca (the department in which Bogotá is located). The list of Horacio Serpa, another prominent Liberal member of the constituent assembly, won only about one third of its votes in Serpa's home department (Santander). These lists, along with that of Carlos Lemos, who won most of his votes in the cities of Bogotá and Cali, were the only Liberal lists to win more than one seat each. Their relative success rested on the new opportunities created by the nationwide district and the leaders' appeal in urban areas.

The list of the Democratic Alliance—M-19, headed by ex-guerrilla Antonio Navarro, won 19 seats; and more than half of its votes came from urban areas (Pinzón de Lewin & Rothlisberger, 1991). Seats were won by several "new" groups such as Evangelicals, indigenous people's movements, and a student group. The reformist, breakaway National Salvation Movement won 11 seats. The list was led by Alvaro Gómez,¹⁰ a former Conservative presidential candidate campaigning against the very clientelism on which he had built his career and thus courting a new urban constituency.

By contrast, the "official" Conservative list of Misael Pastrana and other "independent" Conservative lists, as well as most of the Liberal lists, were overwhelmingly dependent on rural vote brokers. Thus, the constituent assembly had a mixed profile of reformists and traditionalists. Inevitably, the new constitution would reflect compromises between these interests.

THE RESULTING SYSTEM

The constitution passed in 1991 by the constituent assembly and follow-up legislation mandate change in the financing of campaigns and the integrity of party labels, two of the four areas defining the personal-party

10. In an irony that almost qualifies for magical realism, Gómez had once been held hostage by the M-19. In 1991, he and M-19 leader Navarro shared the three-man presidency of the constituent assembly, along with Horacio Serpa, a Liberal.

continuum. Moreover, the election of the Senate in a new nationwide district has opened up opportunities for candidates appealing across the boundaries of the traditional departmental districts. Also, the single nationwide district completely annulled the former malapportionment in the Senate, potentially making the upper chamber much more responsive to urban policy demands. The number of seats per district in the Chamber of Deputies was reduced, which, all else constant, should reduce particularism in that house as well, by making it harder to win a seat with vote blocs as small as before. These changes, which we review in this section, are evidence that momentum is building to shift Colombian institutions in a less clientelistic direction. They also augur for a narrowing of the gap between executive and congressional policy interests, which should allow greater attention to the demands of the urban/median voter.

The new congress. The most significant reform to the Colombian institutional structure mandated by the new constitution is the shift of the Senate from a body representing regional districts just like the lower house, to one elected from a nationwide district. This reform means that each house is elected on a different basis, thereby implying broader consultation in the enactment of policy, because the two houses should be less likely to agree than in the past. Whether the process of reconciling Senate and House majorities works in favor of interests that prefer greater attentiveness to median voter preferences will depend primarily on the composition of the Senate.

The Senate is now elected in a single, 100-seat district.¹¹ Obviously, the national district for the Senate means that the malapportionment of the former congress is corrected in the upper house. With no districting, votes cast in predominantly urban departments are no longer less proportionally represented than those cast in predominantly rural departments. More important, the nationwide Senate district creates new opportunities for candidates (or, rather, the heads of lists) to exploit in attracting the votes needed to win representation. Under the prereform departmental-district system for Senate elections (and continuing in the lower house, as we shall see), a member necessarily represented voters in only one department. Under the new rules, it is still possible for a senator to concentrate his or her votes in just one department, but it is also possible for a candidate to pursue a dispersal strategy: garnering small shares of the votes in multiple departments that aggregate across

11. In addition, two more seats are set aside in a special district for lists representing indigenous peoples. In both 1991 and 1994, two indigenous lists were represented through the principal district as well.

departmental boundaries to reach the number of votes needed to win the election.

The strategy of dispersed votes is most beneficial to nonclientelist parties and movements that could not hope to break the hold of monied groups under the district-based allocation but that can attract minority support in many departments. For instance, the list *Laicos por Colombia* won a seat (with just under 50,000 votes, 0.95% of the total), despite having less than 8,500 votes in its strongest department (Boyacá). Several other lists won seats with similarly dispersed electoral constituencies. By contrast, the list of a Conservative, Fabio Valencia Corssi,¹² had an almost identical vote total, but more than three fourths of his votes came from one department (Antioquia). Despite similar vote totals, under the previous system only the one with the regionally concentrated votes would have been represented.

Even in the major parties, the new structure of opportunities is beginning to change how heads of lists mobilize votes. Because it is now unnecessary to concentrate one's votes in one department, sectors within the party that are not in favor with the local clientele networks can join with similarly situated groups in other localities and win seats. They can base their campaigns on "public-goods" appeals; for instance, some major-party candidates in 1994 sought to build reputations for being pro-environment (*El Tiempo* 1994c). Other reputations can be built on other issues that are more consistent with social responsiveness and programmatic coalition building focused on meeting urban demands than with the regional particularism that dominated both houses in the past.

Table 1 presents some data demonstrating how important strategies of nonconcentrated support have been in the nationwide district thus far. The table shows the average percentage of, and variance in, the vote delivered to candidates (heads of lists) by whatever departmental electorate gave the candidate the plurality of his or her own votes. Under the old system, these figures were necessarily 100%, with no variance. Under the new Senate rules, it is plausible that some members would continue to be overwhelmingly dependent on one department, whereas others would disperse their support across many districts. In the 1991 Senate, the range of senators' dependence on their strongest departments was from 12.5% (the list of the Movimiento para la Salvación Nacional [Movement for National Salvation: MSN], which elected five senators) to 95.3% (a traditional Conservative from the department of Valle). The average, as shown in Table 1, was 62.1% in 1991 and 70.3% in 1994.¹³

12. Running under the label Fuerza Progresista, he later rejoined the Conservatives.

Table 1

Percentage of Senators' Votes That Came From the Department in Which List Won Most of Its Votes

Party	1991					1994				
	% of List's Votes That Came From Department Where List Won Most of Its Votes					% of List's Votes That Came From Department Where List Won Most of Its Votes				
	Number of		Range			Number of		Range		
	Senators	Lists	Mean ^a	Low	High	Senators	Lists	Mean ^a	Low	High
Liberal	56	50	69.1 (19.5)	25.4	92.8	56	54	74.3 (16.0)	32.4	95.3
Conservative	27	16	60.6 (28.4)	12.5	95.3	31	30	74.7 (20.0)	39.1	97.8
MSN	5	1	12.5	—	—	2	2	59.9 (15.3)	44.6	75.2
NFD	8	1	23.9	—	—	5	5	71.5 (18.8)	41.3	97.8
AD/M-19	9	1	15.2	—	—	0	—			
Others	9	9	38.9 (24.0)	15.6	84.5	13	13	43.5 (26.7)	7.7	87.9
All senators	100	75	62.1 (25.1)	12.5	95.3	100	97	70.3 (21.7)	7.7	97.8

Note: MSN = Movimiento para la Salvación Nacional [Movement for National Salvation]; NFD = Nueva Fuerza Democrática [New Democratic Force]; AD/M-19 = Alianza Democrática/ Movimiento 19 de Abril [Democratic Alliance/April 19 Movement].

a. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

The most important indicator of the extent to which more dispersed vote-garnering strategies matter is that there were 13 Liberal senators elected in 1991 and 21 (of 56 total) in 1994 who would not have won seats had they been dependent only on the votes they won in their strongest departments. That is, the Liberal Party would not have held a majority in the Senate had it not been for the attractiveness of some of its candidates outside their home departments. Thus, the Liberal Party has already seen that its majority aspirations depend on new kinds of constituencies.

In the Conservative Party in 1991, the effect of the Senate reform was even more dramatic. Two lists of conservatives, running under new labels, Gómez's National Salvation Movement, and Pastrana's New Democratic

13. That the figure is slightly higher in 1994 is less significant than the fact that both of these figures show that a substantial number of senators have dispersed support. The 1991 result is lower primarily because of three lists (combining for 22 seats) that each won from five to nine seats. In 1994, shown in Table 1, only three senators were elected who were not heads of lists.

Force, each won dispersed votes across the new nationwide district and won five and eight seats respectively. The demonstrated success of Pastrana in a nationwide election led to his being nominated as the common candidate by the reunited conservative factions in advance of the 1994 presidential election, which the Conservatives nearly won.¹⁴ We can expect the national Senate district to continue serving as a useful “proving ground” to aspiring national leaders, who will seek to build national followings focused on appealing to the median voter.

However, although the single nationwide Senate district eliminates the prior malapportionment and likely alleviates some of the effects of extreme personalism, the higher district magnitude should not generate greater centripetal incentives (Cox, 1990). The opposite, in fact, is true. We can expect a greater fragmentation of the electorate into smaller parties and a dispersal of policy programs across the issue spectrum. This can be expected to militate somewhat against the closing of the presidential-congressional policy gap that reforms in the other two areas presaged. However, changes in the other two areas should more than offset this effect. Presidents after 1990 should have more willing Senate allies when it comes to enacting and sustaining policy reforms focused on urban voters.

If the upper house is now more conducive to new styles of campaigning, the lower house remains more or less traditional in its composition. New districts have been created to represent thinly populated areas that previously were absorbed within larger districts. Where before there were 199 seats divided among 26 districts, for an average district magnitude of around 8, now there are 161 seats in 33 districts,¹⁵ for an average magnitude of around 5. Reducing the magnitude of the preexisting districts works to the advantage of larger factions in the dominant parties and should therefore generate somewhat greater centripetal incentives, by weeding out lists appealing to extremely narrow constituencies. This effect was already apparent in 1991, when the median percentage of the district-level vote won by the last candidate elected in a district was 11.7%, up from 8.8% in 1990.

However, the new thinly populated districts have the opposite effect, allowing candidates with local sway over minuscule numbers of voters access to the congress.¹⁶ In fact, whereas the Senate is no longer malapportioned because of its single district, the House of Representatives is vastly more malapportioned than either house was previously: The ratio of most underrepresented to most overrepresented district is 39:1 (compared to

14. In the first round, Pastrana barely trailed the Liberal nominee, Ernesto Samper, who led 45.2% to 44.9%. Samper won the runoff, 50.9% to 49.1%.

15. There are two more seats set aside for representatives of the Black community, elected from a nationwide constituency.

around 3.5:1 before).¹⁷ Even so, Bogotá is less underrepresented than it was before the reform: With 14.7% of the eligible electorate (and 11.2% of actual voters in 1994), it now has 11.2% of the seats in the House. This shift toward better representing Bogotá may prove important to giving voice to urban policy concerns, even in the Chamber of Deputies.

The outcome in terms of the structure of representation can thus be seen as a compromise between the clientelistic and reformist tendencies, both of which were well represented in the constituent assembly. The previous system was one in which both houses were elected from districts, with rural areas overrepresented, and in which only candidates with access to clientelistic resources had much chance to win. The new system contains one house that resembles the constituent assembly itself and is vastly more favorable to nonclientelistic representation than the previous set-up, and another house that partially compensates rural clientelistic interests by enhancing the representation of some very small rural regions. Both houses must agree to legislation and constitutional amendments, and the less clientelistic Senate has been given some new exclusive powers.¹⁸ Therefore, those new movements as well as sectors of the traditional parties that seek to break out of clientelistic practices can no longer be ignored. They have institutionalized veto power, and that power will grow if, as is likely, the trend toward less-concentrated constituencies for senators continues.

Campaign finance and control over party labels. In what we see as a momentum effect of the constitutional reform, in March 1994, the Constitutional Court gave approval to provisions of a law on political parties (Law 130 of 1994), which makes a number of advances in the institutionalization of Colombian parties. Key provisions of the law include the establishment of a fund for the public financing of parties. Thus, it implements an idea that has been considered in Colombia for more than a decade—part of Betancur's defeated reform proposal called for public campaign financing. Under Law

16. In 1991, in three districts, a candidate was elected with less than 1,000 votes. In the median district, around 12,000 votes were sufficient (compared with just more than 21,500 in 1990). Even accounting for the lower voter turnout and the increased number of lists in 1991—both factors that would depress the number of votes needed to win—many members of the new House represent an extremely low number of voters.

17. In comparative terms, this means that what is considered the upper house in Colombia would effectively be the lower house—the house that represents the population—whereas the Colombian lower house resembles other countries' upper houses, in that it overrepresents the less populous districts.

18. The president can extend a state of internal disturbance (the successor to the state of siege) beyond 180 days only with the prior consent of the Senate.

130, the National Electoral Court, a body given greater independence under the 1991 Constitution, oversees the disbursement of funds to all political parties with legal registration or with representation in the congress. Each such party will receive postelection compensation in proportion to its congressional representation in addition to a minimum subvention. Parties can determine on their own how to distribute funds among their candidates. These provisions greatly reduce the dependence of members of congress on their own (or their clientele networks') fund-raising efforts and give party leaders greater sway over the activities of rank and file; therefore, they represent important moves in a party-centered direction and thus make it more likely that congressional parties can improve their responsiveness to median-voter concerns.

The law also grants parties for the first time the authority to sanction members of congress and even expel them from the party if they deviate from party directives in matters of "ethics." In a historic turn of events, the Liberal Party in December 1994 expelled a member who as a congressman had proposed to amend a bill on education in a manner that would benefit only one university—one that the congressman himself had founded (*El Tiempo*, 1994b). The party also used the new law to serve notice that it would not tolerate dissident candidacies by party members in gubernatorial races (*El Tiempo*, 1994a). The law permits parties to bar expelled members from using the party name in future elections. Because the law also makes each party name and symbol proprietary and requires that newly registered parties have names that are clearly distinct from already existent parties, dissidents can no longer launch candidacies under names that resemble that of the party that expelled them.

The new party law thus represents a delegation by rank and file (given that it had to be passed by Congress) to the party leaders of new levers with which to bring coherence to the organization. However, it is important to note that the result will not likely be the highly cohesive, disciplined parties found in some other countries but rather more incremental changes in the direction of greater cohesion. As long as intraparty competition continues, candidates will have the incentive to establish personal reputations. As a result, the public face of the party will appear anything but cohesive. Although the increasing control over finance and over the label might theoretically lead to each party's presenting one list per district—thereby eliminating intraparty competition—we expect multiple lists to continue for the foreseeable future, given the sunk investment of faction leaders and local bosses in their personal reputations and clientele structures.

Although there is no one-to-one link between institutions and policy, we do see reason for optimism that the rural, centrifugal, and particularistic

biases of Colombian institutions have been undercut by the reforms of and since 1991. The incentives of executives to respond to urban demands—epitomized by repeated presidential attempts at such reforms before 1990—and the incentives of congressional party members would appear to be more closely aligned than before the reforms.

EPILOGUE: MORE REFORM?

As we have noted, the reforms of 1991 would tend to build momentum toward more programmatic parties, yet the continued practice multiple lists within parties has meant that the reforms only partially fulfilled their promise. Thus, after the 1998 election resulted in the first Conservative president since 1986, the new government proposed further reform. The government's statement of intent (Ministry of the Interior, n.d.) contained an analysis centered around the arguments, made by Archer and Shugart (1997) and developed further in this article, that the ongoing presence of pork- and patronage-seeking congressional representatives hindered the ability of the Colombian polity to tackle pressing policy problems. In particular, the government noted that the new, more liberal, economic model adopted in Colombia after 1990 (Juárez 1993) was inconsistent with a political model of campaigning based on exchanging votes for pork-barrel favors and special-interest exemptions from general policy. Thus a new set of reforms was proposed to help consolidate the momentum of the 1991 reforms and fill in the remaining gaps between presidential and congressional constituencies.

As of the spring, 1999, the new reforms proposals had not received final approval, but an agreement among all the political forces represented in congress has been reached to enact, among other things, the following additional reforms: (a) Replacing the extant quota-and-largest-remainders electoral formula, which encourages parties to divide into multiple lists (as shown in the Appendix), with d'Hondt divisors, which favor larger lists and hence would greatly reduce the incentives to fragment; (b) Requiring a single list per party in each district, meaning that dissidents could not run independently of their parties yet continue to use the party label; and (c) More fully implement the moves already made toward more centralized financing of congressional campaigns. Although the reform contemplates an open-list form of PR that would still be somewhat personalistic, the drive to eliminate multiple lists and the resulting pooling of all a party's votes in each district are strong indications of the ongoing momentum toward establishing more centralized and programmatic parties that we have identified in this article.

CONCLUSION

The Colombian case provides an example in which presidents, representing median voter preferences in the cities, succeeded in bringing about a change in a political system whose legislature was unresponsive to urban voters because of malapportionment, centripetal incentives, and the personal vote. Presidential and congressional policy incentives were at loggerheads. Reformist presidents found their way difficult because Congress and not the presidents held the final word in policy making and blocked attempts at institutional reform.

Yet, by the end of the 1980s, severe political crisis and social unrest created an opportunity for reform-minded presidents. Massive public support surged for a constitutional reform, even if it meant circumventing the existing constitutionally mandated amendment process. This is why the new institutional structure was crafted in an extracongressional body that enfranchised, in part, a new set of interests that were less clientelistic and less rural than their predecessors, and that had greater incentives to converge on the political center. This new institutional structure provides for increased central party control over rank and file (through the new party law controlling use of the party name and campaign finance) and a broadened constituent base (through the new Senate district that removes the malapportionment). The new system thus incrementally increases the likelihood of policy reforms focused on meeting urban demands and the newly proposed reforms would push the system further away from personalistic representation.

In constructing the new institutions, however, old-style politicians continued to seek ways to protect their constituents' interests, hence the delegation of new authority to central leaders remains limited. The case thus suggests that (a) urban-centered policy reforms are only likely to be sustained if political institutions can be modified or created to filter internal pressures through the domestic polity in a way that encompasses median voter concerns and (b) institutional reform tends to be limited by the previous political institutions and the domestic constituents that the institutions empower.

Further comparative work should be undertaken to explore how reforms are pursued in institutional environments that do not entail as heavy a reliance on legislators' personal reputations for private-goods distribution as in Colombia. Systems with strong party discipline enforced through electoral systems with party-centered institutions are expected to be able to commit better to reforms with significantly fewer concessions to particularistic interests. Examples of such systems are Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Mexico.

In all, we believe that the Colombian case should prove suggestive to analysts seeking to understand how demands for policy reform provoke

institutional change. If the conclusions derived from the Colombian case hold more generally for personalistic systems in other countries, then we can expect that either policy reforms will falter under the pressures of particularistic interests or else some means—perhaps the use of extraparliamentary actions, as in Colombia in 1990-91—of transforming the institutions themselves must be found to make significant policy reforms viable. In Colombia, the existence of a single party with a long record of holding both the executive and congressional majorities gave that party's leaders, and particularly its presidents, a strong incentive to seek such an extraparliamentary solution in the form of the constituent assembly.

Having to divide the pie differently, which is what urban-focused policy reform entails, almost certainly requires that politicians restructure the way in which they achieve electoral support. Failure to reform political institutions accordingly will lead eventually either to the ouster of the party in power or to the breakdown and reversal of the policy reforms, or both. Thus, an understanding of developing countries' efforts to achieve such reform can be attained only by delving into the question of how political institutions condition politicians' behavior and, in turn, how those same politicians can reform the rules of the political game to institutionalize new policy directions.

APPENDIX

An Example of How the Colombian Electoral System Works

The process of allocating seats to lists in Colombia is known as the rule of simple quota and largest remainders. First, seats are awarded to lists, one for each quota of votes that they have won; the quota, q , is defined as $q = V/M$, where V is the valid votes cast in the district and M is the district magnitude (number of seats allocated in the district).¹⁹ Then, after all quotas have been used up, any remaining seats are allocated to the lists with the largest remainders, one seat per list, in descending order.

Table A1 shows an example from the district of Magdalena in 1990, where there were 258,853 valid votes cast. Because the district magnitude was six, the quota was $258,853/6 = 43,166$. Two lists, both headed by Liberal candidates, each won more than 52,000 votes, enough to win one seat by quota. Four seats remain to be filled, so the four lists with the highest remainders each win a seat. The smallest winning remainder was that of a Conservative list with 21,634 votes, or about half a quota. As shown in Table A1, each of four Liberal lists won a seat. However, two of these lists

19. Before 1991, in districts that elected just two seats, the quota used was the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota: $q = V/(M + 1)$.

Table A1

	Votes	Seats by Quota	Remainder	Seats by Remainder	Total Seats
Liberal lists					
1 (Abdalá)	52,945	1	9,779	0	1
2 (Menotti)	52,552	1	9,386	0	1
3 (Ramos)	39,991	0	39,991	1	1
4 (Aduen)	33,669	0	33,669	1	1
Conservative lists					
1 (Mejica)	39,209	0	39,209	1	1
2 (Murica)	21,634	0	21,634	1	1
3 (Alzamora)	18,853	0	18,853	0	0

Note: District magnitude = 6; total valid votes = 258,996; quota = 43,166.

paid more than 50,000 votes per seat, almost two and one half times the cost in votes of the "cheapest" seat.

REFERENCES

- Arboleda, Enrique. (1982). *La Reforma Constitucional de 1979: Su Inexigibilidad* [The constitutional reform of 1979: Its unenforceability]. Bogotá: Editorial Dintel.
- Archer, Ron, & Shugart, Matthew. (1997). The unrealized potential of presidential dominance in Colombia. In Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Shugart (Eds.), *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America* (pp. 110-159). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Archer, Ronald P. (1990). *Paralysis of reform: Political stability and social conflict in Colombia*. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.
- Austen-Smith, David, & Banks, Jeffrey. (1988). Elections, coalitions and legislative outcomes. *American Political Science Review*, 82(8), 405-422.
- Bushnell, David. (1993). *The making of modern Colombia: A nation in spite of itself*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cain, Bruce E., Ferejohn, John, & Fiorina, Morris. (1987). *The personal vote: Constituency service and electoral independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Carey, John M., & Shugart, Matthew S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4), 417-439.
- Carrillo Bedoya, Jaime. (1981). *Los Paros Cívicos en Colombia* [Civic strikes in Colombia]. Bogotá: La Oveja Negra.
- Colombia. Presidencia de la República. 1990. *Una Constituyente de Todos los Colombianos* [A Constituent (Assembly) for all Colombians]. Bogotá.
- Congress of Colombia (1998). *Sobre La Reforma de la Política Colombiana e Instrumentos para la Paz* [On Reform of the Colombia Polity and Instruments for Peace]. Legislative Act No. 88 of 1998.
- Cox, Gary W. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 31, 82-108.

- Cox, Gary W., & McCubbins, Mathew D. (1996). *Structure and policy: The institutional determinants of policy outcomes*. Typescript, University of California, San Diego.
- Cox, Gary W., & Shugart, Matthew S. (1995). In the absence of vote pooling: Nomination and allocation errors in Colombia. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4), 441-460.
- de la Torre, Cristina. (Ed.). (1985). *Reformas Políticas: Apertura Democrática* [Political Reforms: Democratic Opening]. Bogotá: Editorial Oveja Negra.
- Downs, Anthony. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- El Tiempo*. (1994a, October 24). Castigo a candidatos disidentes [Punishment to dissident candidates]. p. 7A.
- El Tiempo*. (1994b, December 6). Liberalismo expulsó a César Pérez [Liberalism expelled César Pérez]. pp. 1A, 8A.
- El Tiempo*. (1994c, March 12). Quiénes son los "verdes" que aspiran al Congreso? [Who are the "greens" who aspire for the Congress?] p. 13C.
- Enelow, James M., & Hinich, Melvin. (1984). *The spatial theory of voting: An introduction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fox, Jonathan. (1994). The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship. *World Politics*, 46(2), 151-184.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan. (1988). *The politics of coalition rule in Colombia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Iversen, Torben. (1994). The logics of electoral politics: Spatial, directional and mobilizational effects. *Comparative Political Studies*, 27(2), 155-189.
- Juárez, Carlos. (1993). Trade and development policies in Colombia: Export promotion and outward orientation, 1967-1992. *Studies In Comparative International Development*, 28/3(fall), 67-97.
- Katz, Richard S. (1980). *A theory of parties and electoral systems*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Losada, Rodrigo, & Velez, Eduardo. (1982). *Identificación y participación Política en Colombia* [Identification and political participation in Colombia]. Bogotá: Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo.
- López, Edmundo Gómez. (1990). *La Verdadera Constituyente: Análisis Político y Jurídico* [The Real Constituent (Assembly): Political and Legal Analysis]. Bogotá: Ediciones Librería del Profesional.
- Mainwaring, Scott & Shugart, Matthew S. (1997). Conclusion: Presidentialism and the party system. In Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Shugart (Eds.) *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America* (pp. 394-439). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Martz, John D. (1997). *The politics of clientelism: Democracy and the state in Colombia*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., & Rosenbluth, Frances M. (1995). Party provision for personal politics: Dividing the vote in Japan. In Peter F. Cowhey & Mathew D. McCubbins (Eds.) *Structure and policy in Japan and the United States* (pp. 35-55). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McKelvey, Richard D. (1986). Covering, dominance, and institution-free properties of social choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 30, 283-314.
- Ministry of the Interior. (n.d.) *Planteamiento del Problema y Cuestionario* [Setting Forth the Problem and Questionnaire]. Bogotá: Colombia.
- Myerson, Roger B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative elective systems. *American Political Science Review*, 87(4), 856-869.

- Nielson, Daniel. (1997a). *The development shift: The political economy of policy adjustment and institutional reform*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
- Nielson, Daniel. (1997b, April). *Electoral rules and policy outcomes: An empirical exploration in Latin America*. Paper presented at the Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico.
- Pinzûn de Lewin, Patricia, & Rothlisberger, Dora. (1991). La participación electoral en 1990: Un nuevo tipo de votante? [Electoral participation in 1990: A new type of voter?] In Rubén Sánchez David (Ed.), *Los Nuevos Retos Electorales—Colombia 1990: Antesala del Cambio*. (pp. 133-166) Bogotá: CEREC.
- Przeworski, Adam, & Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rabinowitz, George, & Macdonald, Stuart. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review*, 22, 93-121.
- Rabinowitz, George, Macdonald, Stuart, & Listhaug, Ola. (1991). New players in an old game: Party strategy in multiparty systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, 24(2), 147-185.
- Ramseyer, Mark, & Rosenbluth, Frances M. (1993). *Japan's political marketplace*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Revèiz, Edgar, & Pérez, María José. (1986). Colombia: Moderate economic growth, political stability, and social welfare. In Jonathan Hartlyn & Samuel A. Morley (Eds.), *Latin American political economy: Financial crisis and political change* (pp. 265-287). Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Santamaría, Ricardo S., & Silva, Gabriel. (1984). *Proceso Político en Colombia: Del Frente Nacional a la Apertura Democrática* [The Political Process in Colombia: From the National Front to the Democratic Opening]. Bogotá: CEREC.
- Shugart, Matthew S. (1992a). Guerrillas and elections: An institutionalist perspective on the costs and conflicts of competition. *International Studies Quarterly*, 36, 121-152.
- Shugart, Matthew S. (1992b). Leaders, rank and file, and constituents: Electoral reform in Colombia and Venezuela. *Electoral Studies* 11:21-45.
- Urrutia, Miguel. (1991). On the absence of economic populism in Colombia. In Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards (Eds.), *The macroeconomic of populism in Latin America* (pp. 369-387). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Urrutia, Miguel. (1994). Colombia. In John Williamson (Ed.), *The political economy of policy reform* (pp. 285-315). Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Daniel L. Nielson is an assistant professor of political science at Brigham Young University. He is coeditor of Latin American Environmental Policy in International Perspective (Westview, 1997). His work focuses on the effects of political institutions on political behavior and public policy.

Matthew Soberg Shugart is an associate professor of political science in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. He is coauthor of Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (Yale University Press, 1989) and Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, 1992); coeditor of Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Ex-

ecutive Decree Authority (*Cambridge University Press, 1998*); and the author of several journal articles on electoral systems, electoral reform, and presidentialism. In 1999, he was retained as a consultant by the Colombian Ministry of the Interior to review proposed electoral reform.